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Abstract 
The idea of an eternal and immortal life like the one we lead now seems quite appealing because 
(i) it will be sufficiently like our own earth-bound life and (ii) we will have the same kinds of desires 
we have now to want to live an eternal life.  This paper will challenge the view that we have a 
conception of what the conscious experience of an immortal is like, regardless of whether we 
might want to live it. Given that for us to conceive of an immortal life we must project onto it our 
own view of what it is like to live our own life and given that an immortal life may not be anything 
like the life we live, we cannot conceive of what it is like to be immortal. 
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An immortal life seems quite appealing for us mortals. The pollyannaish thought that we could 
live a life like our own for an infinite amount of time increases the likelihood that our life would 
be filled with tremendous joy and happiness. The unhappiness and disutility of any single moment 
would be greatly overshadowed by moments of unspeakable and incalculable moments of bliss. 
The sadness and heartache of losing loved ones, close friends, siblings, and parents would be 
forevermore mere fantasy.  
The aim of this paper is to argue that we are not in a good epistemic position to judge what 
the subjective experiences of an immortal would be like. The thought that we would desire to live 
a life for 100,000 years, or even 1,000,000 years, is based upon a prejudice in favour of our actual 
physical and psychological condition persisting into the hereafter. If it turns out that our prejudice 
in favour of our actual life and all of its accompanying psychological conditions fails to discriminate 
fact from fiction, then we would have no reason to think we are able to conceive of who we will 
become. Given that for us to conceive of an immortal life we must project onto it our own view 
of what it is like to live our own life and given that the experiences of an immortal life may not be 
anything like the life we live, we cannot conceive of what it is like to be immortal. Along the way, 
I will have to consider some potential objections to this position. In conclusion, the thought that 
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I would prefer an immortal life cannot be entertained by us, since we have no idea what the 
experience of that future living thing would be. 
 
1. Conditions and Definitions 
Prior to setting out an argument showing that we cannot judge whether an immortal life is 
desirable, some space should be dedicated to the background conditions that the argument 
assumes to be true. These background conditions follow those set out by Bernard Williams in his 
landmark paper: “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality” (1973), and 
by others, such as Donald Bruckner (2012), Jay Rosenberg (2006), and Hunter Steele (1976). 
Let us begin by noting that the argument for showing that we are not in a good epistemic 
position to judge whether an immortal life is desirable depends upon a thought experiment that 
elicits a judgment about the concept of ‘immortality’.  The thought experiment presented here will 
ask us to determine whether we know what it would be like to live the life of an immortal. Since 
we are not immortals ourselves and since we have no justificatory evidence from other immortals, 
we ultimately cannot know what it would be like to be immortal.  One might note that the thought 
experiment presented in this paper seems to exploit the foci of realist phenomenology.  Realist 
phenomenology has focused upon the essence of God and the essence of human persons. God 
and humans share in personhood, but human personhood is finite and God’s divine personhood 
is infinite.1  
To consider the argument for or against the desirability of an immortal life, we must assume 
that the universe as we know it will never cease to exist in a physical state other than in its current physical state. 
Despite what our best science tells us, i.e., that the universe eventually will cool and collapse in 
upon itself or contract back in on itself obliterating everything from existence, what we assume 
                                                 
1 I thank a reviewer for pointing out that some elements of realist phenomenology may be 
relevant to this paper. However, it should be noted that I am not a phenomenologist. See Mezei 
(2017) or Smith (1997) for helpful discussions of realist phenomenology. 
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for this argument is that the universe immortals colonize is a world without end. There is no end 
to time, and the world as we have come to know it will continue to exist exactly as we have come 
to know it.2 That the physical universe remains in its current state suggests that the body-bound 
immortal must remain in its current state, too.  
There are different definitions of ‘immortality’, but the one discussed here is a body-bound, 
or ‘punctuated’, immortality.  It is a limited embodied form of everlasting life where we retain our 
own body at a predefined physical time period and inhabit that physical form for an indefinite or 
unbounded amount of time (cf. Bruckner 2012, 626; Rosenberg 2006, 228). The punctuated 
immortal life is one lived in a physical body that does not age or physically deteriorate. Despite the 
lack of change to one’s physical characteristics, it is supposed that a person’s psychological or 
mental life would continue to evolve. 
That the person would remain a physical age, such as the age of 42, is completely random. Any 
way that one would like to conceive of the age of the punctuated immortal will suffice for the 
example to work. If one prefers the age of 25 over the age of 42, then so be it. The age of the 
person seems to make no difference. It is not beyond the example for one to inhabit the physical 
body of a 72 year-old or a 15 year-old, though the person may be subject to certain biases or 
prejudices of others that go along with being elderly or adolescent.3  
The punctuated immortal life does not come without its limitations. Among its most salient 
limitations is the immortal’s susceptibility to death by human cause. Should the person choose to 
jump from the Empire State Building or run in freeway traffic, the person will die from injuries 
sustained by what one would expect when leaping from tall buildings or playing in traffic. Likewise, 
                                                 
2 Of the assumptions one must adopt to entertain the desirability of immortal life, this is likely the 
most controversial one. Naturalists will reject the idea that the universe could exist in its current 
form for an eternity. 
3 In other words, if other immortals are eternally 35 and human prejudices carry over to the 
immortal life, e.g., ageism, then the 72-year-old may have to confront the uncomfortable realisation 
that that physical body of the punctuated immortal body matters to other immortals when it comes 
to hiring or mating decisions. 
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immortals could mortally wound other immortals, whether by shooting, stabbing, poisoning, or 
beating another to death.  
Moreover, following Williams (1973, 82-84), the person will have to drink an elixir every three 
hundred years. The immortal life does not come without consequence. If the person fails to drink 
the elixir at the designated 300-year interval, then the person’s life will come to an end. This permits 
the immortal to become mortal again. If the person becomes bored by the life she’s leading, then 
she can choose to end it without involving oneself or others in some sort of potentially criminal 
activity. 
 
2. The Makropulos Case 
In this section, I summarise Bernard Williams’ dilemma, setting up the next section wherein I 
argue that what it is to be immortal can only be understood if one is immortal. Our finding an 
immortal life appealing depends upon our having an appreciation of the subjective qualitative 
states that accompany an immortal life.  
Williams (1973) has argued that an immortal life must satisfy two conditions to eschew acute 
boredom: (i) the future person must be identical to the person as they are now, and (ii) the life of 
the immortal must be attractive to the person as they are now. The two conditions imply a 
dilemma: either the body-bound immortal will remain psychologically the same as the mortal or 
one’s psychological disposition will change (and perhaps radically so). If the immortal remains the 
same as the mortal, then the desire to continue living will decrease and the person will eventually 
wish not to be immortal. If the person’s psychological disposition changes, then the mortal will 
not believe immortality to be desirable because the immortal will become someone very different 
from the mortal one is now.  By way of illustration, Williams presents the case of Elina Makropulos 
(hereafter ‘EM’) from The Makropoulus Secret.  EM possesses an elixir, a single dose of which is 
capable of extending her life by three hundred years with no physical signs of ageing. When we 
first encounter her, she is 342 years old, having taken a single dose at the biological age of 42, and 
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is contemplating whether to drink the elixir another time.  Williams tells us that EM’s life has 
become boring, indifferent, and cold.4 So, EM now has no stake in seeing to it that the future 
person she would become in the case of consuming the elixir should come to pass. Given the 
outcome of EM, it looks very bad for choosing to live any longer than we absolutely must.5   
Williams argued that a punctuated immortal life with infinitely many relevantly similar 
experiences would be an insufferably tedious one that would not be worth living, and for which it 
is not at all unreasonable to end.  If one has a desire for immortality, then it likely comes about 
because of a desire for a free and open future, to do what one wants to do and to go on living.   It 
is not that we have incomplete information about such a future as an immortal but that we cannot 
imagine what sort of beings we would be in it.6  So, rather than focus upon whether or not an 
infinite life is worth living or even appealing to us now, I endeavour to challenge a prevailing 
assumption of Williams, and others who work in this area, that the subjective qualitative 
phenomenological experiences of the immortal is sufficiently similar to our own (cf. Bortolotti and 
Nagasawa 2009; Bostrom 2008; Bruckner 2012; Chappell 2007; Fischer 1994; Fischer 1997; Gems 
2003; Johnston 2010; Preston 2007).  If the qualitative experiences of one’s mortal self and one’s 
immortal self are sufficiently dissimilar, then we fail to be in a position to compare the two.  
The next section discusses further the subjective phenomenal character of experience and why 
we ought to think that we cannot extend it to organisms and entities, including body-bound 
                                                 
4 Changing the parameters of the EM example yields a change in one’s response to the case. For 
example, if the physical body did not remain intact at the age of 42 or if the mental life of the 
individual began to deteriorate in any way, we might find the case less appealing. 
5 In another paper, Beisecker and Ulatowski (unpublished ms) have argued that living a body-
bound immortal life would not only become chronically boring but also living an immortal life 
would provide us with ample time to solve all of the pressing questions we would ever want to 
resolve and exhaust all realms of science, thus leaving us, scientists included, twiddling our thumbs 
for an eternity. The thought of such boredom would be too much for any one of us to take, and 
we would choose to take our own life. 
6  Roman Altshuler (2015) has a profound discussion of what role conative states play in 
immortality, and Jay Rosenberg (2006) has a nice summary showing what is unknown about 
immortality makes its openness so desirable. 
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immortals, because we are not even vaguely familiar with the kind of experience these things might 
have. 
 
3. The Argument 
The literature on immortality typically begins with the intuition that we would want to live a 
life like ours for an eternity. Although we are intimately familiar with our own life and our own 
lived experiences, we seem to assume that the phenomenology of sensory experience will not 
appreciate or depreciate over an infinite amount of time. The immortal’s sensory experience would 
not differ substantially in any way from our own sensory experience, but this seems to neglect that 
the mortal life is transitory in a way that an immortal life would not be.  In this section, I will argue 
that one cannot decipher what it is like to be immortal, even if, rather naively, we believe the 
experiences of an immortal seem overwhelmingly like our own mortal experiences. 
My main argument should reflect the influence of Thomas Nagel’s famous bat case. We should 
remember that Nagel argued that the subjective character of the conscious experience of a bat, i.e., 
the ‘what-it-is-like’ component of consciousness, is something we (non-bats) cannot conceive. To 
begin with, we have to characterise the subjective character of phenomenal experience.  
The subjective character of phenomenal experience is the “what-it-is-like” experience we have 
of the world around us. According to Nagel,  
 
Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. … [N]o matter how the form may 
vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there 
is something it is like to be that organism. … [A]n organism has conscious mental states if 
and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism - something it is like for the 
organism. (Nagel 1979, 166) 
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To be conscious is to have particular sensations and experiences, and these cognitive states are 
specifically restricted to one’s own experience. There is no way for any agent to perceive what 
another agent encounters through the five sensory modalities. To believe that conscious 
experience is ubiquitous enough for any one person to have the very same sensations as any other 
person is to confuse experience with something like empathy.7  
David Chalmers, among others, followed on Nagel’s analysis of the qualitative states associated 
with our conscious experience. For him—like Nagel before him—Chalmers believes that 
consciousness is utterly mysterious, but contends that the subjective phenomenal part of it 
presents us with a ‘hard problem’. His notion of consciousness has it that: 
 
[I]t is at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is 
nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is far from clear how to 
reconcile it with everything else we know. … We know consciousness far more intimately 
than we know the rest of the world, but we understand the rest of the world far better than 
we understand consciousness. 
 
[…] 
 
The subject matter [of consciousness] is perhaps best characterised as “the subjective 
quality of experience.” When we perceive, think, and act, there is a whir of causation and 
information processing, but this processing does not usually go on in the dark. There is 
also an internal aspect; there is something it feels like to be a cognitive agent. This internal 
aspect is conscious experience. Conscious experiences range from vivid colour sensations 
                                                 
7  I will not have the space in this paper to discuss the overlapping similarities between 
consciousness and empathy, though one can readily see how an agent might confuse the two. 
Whereas empathy is something we can have for others and their experiences, it is not to presume 
that we have exactly the same sensations. After all, we are not them, and they are not us. 
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to experiences of the faintest background aromas; from hard-edged pains to the elusive 
experience of thoughts on the tip of one's tongue; from mundane sounds and smells to 
the encompassing grandeur of musical experience; from the triviality of a nagging itch to 
the weight of a deep existential angst; from the specificity of the taste of peppermint to 
the generality of one's experience of selfhood. All these have a distinct experienced quality. 
All are prominent parts of the inner life of the mind. (Chalmers 1996, 3) 
 
The inner life of the mind is the something it is like to be human. It is the qualitative feel associated 
with having some experience and being in that particular mental state. 
So, the subjective character of phenomenal experience or qualia of conscious experience is 
something with which we are intimately familiar. We can readily see that one thing we have in 
common with other organisms of our species is our conscious experience. The question is whether 
we can argue that other organisms, i.e., those outside our own species, have this subjective 
character of phenomenal experience. 
There is no doubt that other organisms have some kind of sensory experience. We need only 
observe ants navigating around obstacles to realise that they must have some kind of sensory 
experience. Species closer to our own, like chimpanzees, seem to have subjective phenomenal 
conscious experience closer to our own than the conscious experience of ants. It seems that way to 
us because of our overwhelming desire to say that entities which resemble us must have a similar 
form of conscious experience.   
Species unlike us, such as ants, do not resemble us and, hence, likely do not have conscious 
experience like us. Instead of ants, Nagel, for example, chose to contrast our conscious experience 
with the sensory experience of bats. This is not likely a coincidental choice on Nagel’s part. Bats 
are unique because their primary way of interacting with the world is through echolocation. Since 
we do not navigate the world using echolocation, it makes us as a species an unlikely candidate to 
recognise the conscious experience of bats. We do not know what it is like to be a bat. The 
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subjective character of experience is unrecognisable by us given the dissimilarities between the two 
species. 
If we cannot extrapolate to the case of other organisms, e.g., bats, then there seems reason to 
deny that we can know what it is like to be that other organism. The case of conceiving what it is 
like to be a bat or ant or bacteria seems like something we cannot possibly understand. The species 
are just too distantly related to our own for us to have a clear way of judging whether our own 
experience overlaps with theirs. But one might argue immortal humans are closely related to us. 
They are not another species; they are our own species in an alternative form. So, it seems 
ridiculous to believe that we cannot form a conception of what it is like to be an immortal. 
The view that we are able to conceive of what it is like to be immortal rests upon a mistake. 
While we are capable of conceiving the possibility of an immortal life, permanent, unending and 
unchanging, we are not well placed to conceive of what it is like to be such an entity that is so 
permanent.  An immortal, even one bound to a human body, is something that lasts forever. The 
immortal life is missing a sense of closure, the possibility of death, that enables us to derive a sense 
of worth and meaning for having completed individual projects (cf. Burley 2009; Nussbaum 1989). 
Mortals will not last forever, so the narrative arc of our own mortal lives depends upon life’s 
fleetingness. Memories might fade and desires rejuvenate over the course of an immortal life, but 
the property of “living forever” and the immutability of immortal life is so vastly different from 
our own transiency that we are incapable of conceiving what it is like to be immortal. Because we 
lack a property that immortals have, we can say not only that our conscious experiences differ 
from their immortal conscious experience but that we are different. Given the substantial 
difference between human mortals and human immortals, we cannot conceive of what it is like to 
be an immortal (despite that we might think we comprehend the experiences we have as mortals 
and that these experiences carryover to immortality). 
Our bodies are structurally quite distinct, too. The physical constitution of an immortal 
“body,” especially in how it is attained through the elixir, necessarily implies that material 
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composition of an immortal is fundamentally different than that of the mortal human body.  We 
must not forget that human beings have been endowed with bodily physiological functions that 
are necessary for a healthy bodily life.  For example, the digestive system of a human consists of 
the mouth, esophagus, stomach, gastrointestinal tract, liver, pancreas, gall bladder, and salivary 
glands.  Some humans suffer biliary dyskinesia when the gallbladder does not empty bile correctly.  
This would prompt a doctor to remove the gallbladder.  The function of the gallbladder has 
deteriorated over the course of the person’s life.  The so-called immortal’s body would not undergo 
such change. The immortal body is fundamentally different from the mortal one, not just at the 
macro-level but at the molecular or cellular level.  Even if the immortal were human-like in 
appearance, the body of the immortal would be so different from mortal that the two would be 
different kinds of being. 
Recently, Laurie Paul (2014) has argued that one cannot make a rational decision about 
whether to have children on the basis of what it will be like to have them because the experience 
of having children is transformative: one cannot, prior to the experience, know what it will be like 
(and what things will be like for one) post-experience. Despite not knowing exactly about the 
outcome for having children, we still have a rough estimation of what life will be like with a child. 
We have a good sense that the child will demand some of our resources, that we will have to attend 
to the child’s needs, and that we may have to forgo our own desires in order to preserve the child’s 
life. We have a good sense of what is possible and what is likely in the domain of human 
experience.  Whilst we do not know exactly what we will be like after the baby is born, we can 
have a pretty good idea of what life will be like.   
The same cannot be said of the transformative experience between a mortal life and an 
immortal body-bound life.  The body-bound immortal will not grow old as mortals do. The face 
and body they see in the mirror is the same one day-in and day-out, and their sensory experience, 
likewise, will not change in the ways that ours does from one year to the next.   
 11 
Carving nature at its joints might not convince the critic that mortals and immortals are 
fundamentally different. The body-bound immortal is near enough to the mortal such that the 
critic might contend that the experiences of the immortal are not a matter of difference in kind 
but a matter of difference of degree. We can infer from our own experiences what it would be like 
to be an immortal, particularly a body-bound immortal because the experiences of both are closely 
connected and are different only insofar as the degree of experience one possesses.  
Distinguishing between the experience of an immortal and those of mortals cannot be just a 
matter of degree. When we think of what sort of things could differ in degree, we probably think 
of alterations in colour saturation or heat intensity. In summer, heat is more intense than it is in 
winter. If the child bears down softly on the red crayon, leaving more white paper to show through, 
the colour will look less like red and more like pink. Qualitative experiential states fail to possess 
the property of intensity. Sure, there might be situations where one visually senses something more 
intensely, such as watching a comrade be shot or the blue sky absent any haze. The sky’s colour 
saturation or the intensity of living through a battle in war come in degrees, but the qualitative 
experience is something someone has or does not have. 
We should avoid the temptation to believe that an immortal’s subjective experience differs in 
degree from our own sensory experience given that our own mortality presents certain epistemic 
limits. Beglin (2017) has argued that we should not relinquish our mortality because body-bound 
immortality fails to live up to Williams’ unthinkability condition: ‘Nothing less will do for eternity than 
something that makes boredom unthinkable’ (Williams 1973, 87).  We cannot divorce the threat of 
boredom from the question of what immortality would be like, and we have not the epistemic 
grounds to judge what an immortal life would be like.  At least one of Beglin’s reasons has to do 
with our temptation for believing that the subjective experiences of an immortal life is merely an 
extension of our mortal life.  We should avoid the assumption that what our subjective experiences 
are now extends into an immortal life. It is generally unclear how a mortal could appreciate the 
value of an immortal’s subjective qualitative states without being able to comprehend what they 
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would be like.  Subjective experiences form a fundamental part of our mortal life in a way that they 
may, or may not, for the immortal.   
To imagine what it is like to be immortal is to imagine being a creature well beyond the confines 
of our own skin.  Even if we limit ourselves to conceptualising body-bound immortals, it is too 
distant from our own subjective experiences. 
 
We are somehow imagining creatures who are meant to be like us but who are not 
embodied in the way we are, who pass through no stages of life, who know nothing of the 
characteristic challenges, triumphs, or disasters associated with any of those stages, who 
need not work to survive, who do not undergo danger or overcome it, who do not age or 
face death or the risk of it, who do not experience the reactions of grief and loss that the 
death of a loved one inspires, and who never have to make what they can of the limited 
time and opportunities that they have been given. (Scheffler 2013, 98-99) 
 
There is very little in the body-bound immortal’s subjective experience that resembles our own, 
especially when we consider the temporal elements of our decision-making about life events, 
choosing a mate or changing careers. None of these would bother the body-bound immortal. Mere 
mortals cannot appreciate that to slip the surly bonds of earth is to touch the face of God. 
Everything about how we organise our life is predicated upon its transitoriness. The 
impermanence of the mortal life gives it a narrative arc. 
In this section, I have called into question whether the conscious experience we possess as 
mere mortals lacks a property the subjective qualitative experience an immortal might have. To 
my mind, the substantive difference in the two kinds of experience is largely a result of the 
difference in the stability of immortality and mortality. We ought not to judge the experiences of 
a permanent being who could live forever from the perspective in which we are now confined. 
Coming to terms with who that person is and how that person views the world may be so different 
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from the person I am now that it is impossible to conceive of what it is like to be immortal. Just 
as we fail to understand how animals like bats, cows, and ants experience the world, we cannot 
know how we—years hence—will view the world. Given that for us to conceive of an immortal 
life we must project onto it our own view of what it is like to be us, and what our conscious 
experience is like, and given that an immortal life may not be anything like the life we live, we 
cannot conceive of what it is like to be immortal. 
 
4. Objections 
That the conscious experience of an immortal is inconceivable does not arise without 
controversy and it is the purpose of this section of the paper to summarise potential criticisms of 
my position. By no stretch of the imagination will I be able to anticipate and resolve all possible 
objections; rather, I limit myself to some of the most troubling problems the position must 
address.  
 
4.1. Facts vs. Point-Of-View 
First, a critic might argue that my conclusion has no support because we cannot rule out that 
there is a fact of the matter regarding whether the conscious experience I have now resembles the 
conscious experience of my future body-bound immortal self. It may not be possible for us to 
know how many stars there are in the universe. We may never possess the capability to count the 
total number of stars in the universe. When someone says that “there is an odd number of stars 
in the universe,” the fact is true of a universe in which the number of stars is odd. Nagel anticipates 
this objection when he writes: 
 
My realism about the subjective domain in all its forms implies a belief in the existence of 
facts beyond the reach of human concepts. Certainly it is possible for a human being to 
believe that there are facts which humans never will possess the requisite concepts to 
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represent or comprehend. Indeed, it would be foolish to doubt this, given the finiteness 
of humanity's expectations. After all, there would have been transfinite numbers even if 
everyone had been wiped out by the Black Death before Cantor discovered them. (Nagel 
1979, 171) 
 
According to this objection, our inability to conceive of the immortal life does not rule against the 
fact that there is a conscious experience associated with immortal life. There is a what it is like or 
qualitative experience exemplified in a life without end. Even if it is something with which we are 
unfamiliar now, we might become familiar with it in the future when immortals prevail on earth or 
we ourselves become these immortals, such as in the case of EM. 
Nagel seemingly admits, however, that the critic’s response is too quick. There might be certain 
facts that have been, are now, and always will be inaccessible to us humans, no matter how long 
we live and no matter what we discover about the facts. Nagel says: 
 
But one might also believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or 
comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted for ever - simply because our 
structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type. This 
impossibility might even be observed by other beings, but it is not clear that the existence 
of such beings, or the possibility of their existence, is a precondition of the significance of 
the hypothesis that there are humanly inaccessible facts. (After all, the nature of beings 
with access to humanly inaccessible facts is presumably itself a humanly inaccessible fact.) 
(Ibid.) 
 
Ultimately, then, there might be a fact of the matter about what it is like to be immortal and what 
it is like to be a bat, but what I am considering here, and what Nagel tried to point out in his own 
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essay is that there is a fact (or facts) associated with the particular point of view of the immortal 
with which we are not remotely able to comprehend or to conceive. 
 
4.2. The Future Is Not What It Used To Be 
Second, a critic might contend that my argument suggesting that we cannot conceive of our 
own future mental life presupposes that our future self living a body-bound immortal life has 
radically different experiences of the world than the sensory experiences of the person who lives 
in the present. If my argument is correct, so the critic will argue, then it is not my own mental life 
that experiences the future but the mental life of someone else, some distinct future self. According 
to the objection, it does not seem to be true that anyone other than myself will be living the future 
life. Therefore, we ought to reject my argument that a punctuated immortal life is something we 
cannot conceive.  
The critic has a point, but I do not believe it is one we ought to find compelling. When we 
were children, we formed beliefs about what our future occupation would be. Perhaps Smith 
wanted to be a lawyer. Whatever it is that Smith preferred at an earlier time in life might not have 
come to pass later in life. Smith, instead, becomes a manager of a fast-food chain restaurant. When 
Smith reflects upon it, the thought might be that as a young child Smith might not have been able 
to conceive of becoming a manager of a fast-food restaurant. Nothing about the decision to 
become the manager may have crossed young Smith’s mind. It seems, then, that young Smith and 
older Smith are two distinct individuals, with distinct preferences and with distinct goals, 
experiencing the world in fundamentally different ways.   
The critic might respond that my assessment is unfair because it fails to account for the 
evolution of Smith’s preferences and the story we might be able to tell of how young Smith’s 
penchant for good food served quickly led Smith to augment such a desire by pursuing a career in 
the fast-food industry. Moreover, perhaps Smith developed a disdain for studying. This would rule 
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out becoming a lawyer because it requires a great deal of study. The evolution of Smith’s interests 
would give the critic some leverage in a negative response to the argument I have outlined. 
Of course, it seems that even Nagel has already anticipated a response we might provide to 
the evolution worry raised above. He writes: 
 
Experience itself … does not seem to fit the pattern. … Certainly it appears unlikely that 
we will get closer to the real nature of our human point of view and striving for a 
description in terms accessible to beings that could not imagine what it was like to be us. 
If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of 
view, then any shift to greater objectivity---that is, less attachment to a specific view point-
--does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us farther away 
from it. (Nagel 1979, 173) 
 
To suppose that we grasp the subjective phenomenal character of conscious experience of some 
future state because we can understand how that future state developed from an earlier sensory 
experience seems to confuse the ‘real nature’ of subjective experience with our ability to abstract 
our thoughts away from our occurrent conscious states. For the objector to be correct, the 
response would require us to think not in terms of the phenomenological experience of some 
future self but in terms of how life events have altered over the course of a lifetime.  
 
4.3. Perry on ‘Other Organisms’ 
Finally, a critic might be tempted to argue that an immortal human’s conscious experience 
could not possibly differ from our own experience. As John Perry (2001) has pointed out, there is 
a marked distinction between arguing that one’s experience is different from another’s experience 
and showing that something lacks a property that another entity has. He writes:  
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It is not enough to show that the properties we discover about a, thought about in one 
way, are quite different than those we associate with b, thought about in another way. We 
must show that a clearly lacks a property b has. Somewhat paradoxically, the more unlike 
a and b seem to be at first glance, the harder this may be to show. In particular, one has to 
keep in mind a fact that seems at first quite odd. Although the truth of the statement “a = 
b” requires something pretty important of a and b, it does not require much of anything 
about “a” and “b,” other than that there is a single thing to which they both refer. “a” does 
not need to be definable in terms of “b,” or to have been introduced in terms of “b,” or to 
involve properties that supervene on those that “b” involves, or vice versa. In this sense, 
identity is a very weak relation. (Perry 2001, 6) 
 
I have tried to emphasise this point in my argument, i.e., that it is not enough to show that 
differences exist in the perceptions the young body-bound immortal and the older body-bound 
immortal has. There is, according to my argument, a property that the body-bound immortal has 
that we do not. For one, the body-bound immortal is immortal. Since we fail to possess the 
property of immortality and it seems an integral part of being immortal, I believe that should be 
enough to show that one entity lacks a property the other possesses and that that property is 
fundamental enough to challenge the soundness of Perry’s potential criticism. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have outlined three potential criticisms that recommend against the view that one cannot 
conceive of the immortal’s subjective character of conscious experience. Projecting our own views 
of subjective conscious experience onto the hypothetical life of an immortal seems like a promising 
way of comprehending whether we would find such an interminable life appealing or not. What I 
have attempted to argue in this paper is that the projection is inconceivable. Similarly, given that 
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an immortal like may not have the “what-it-is-like” qualia we typically associate with our own life 
experiences, we cannot conceive of what it is like to be immortal.8 
 
  
                                                 
8 I  would like to thank Dave Beisecker,  Donald Bruckner, Mark Ernste, Luciana 
Garbayo, Kristen Hine, John McClure, Stephen Sullivan, and especially  Marc Moﬀett 
for conversations and correspondence leading to a draft of this  paper , and I am 
especially grateful for the constructive feedback received from Justine Kingsbury and 
two referees to help shape the manuscript  into what it  is . 
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